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GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
AFTER PROFESSIONAL VIRTUE
Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa'
involved the question whether a statute empowering a federal judge
to "request" an attorney to represent an indigent in a civil case2
meant to create an obligation on the part of the attorney. Five Jus-
tices, speaking through Justice Brennan, held that an attorney could
decline such a request.
Four Justices-Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor dissenting
with Justice Stevens-thought the statute was using polite language
to describe an order. Hence, they thought an attorney had a legal
obligation to accept an appointment. Both opinions cited history, not
only the deliberations preceding the enactment of the statute in 1892
but more ancient antecedents as well. Both opinions acknowledged
the tradition that members of the bar have an obligation to represent
indigents. The majority relied on Professor David Shapiro's admi-
rable study of the question. 3 The dissent quoted Justice Field from
over a century ago: "Counsel are not considered at liberty to reject
... the cause of the defenseless, because no provision for their com-
pensation is made by law."'4
The dissent also thought that the statute expressed: "the congres-
sional design of ensuring the poor litigant equal justice whether the
suit is prosecuted in federal or state court .... -
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., is Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1109 S.Ct. 1814(1989).
228 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which provides: "The court may request an attorney [to represent the
indigent]."
3See Shapiro, The Enigma of the Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 735 (1980).
4109. S.Ct. at 1824-25, quoting from Rowe v. Yaba County, 17 Cal. 61, 63 (1860).
5109 S.Ct. at 1825.
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The majority seemed equally cognizant of the ideal of equal justice
for the poor. They observed: "In a time when the need for legal ser-
vices among the poor is growing and public funding for such services
has not kept pace, lawyers' ethical obligation to volunteer their time
pro bonopublico is manifest. ' 6
But the majority concluded that the term "request" in the statute
did not seem to denote "order," "direct," or "appoint."
Both opinions happily were free of internecine zaps and zingers.
Indeed, the opinions manifest a similar sadness that the "congres-
sional design" notwithstanding, "public funding for such services
has not kept pace." While questing equal justice, the law also has re-
sponsibility to decide, authoritatively and coherently, what to do in-
asmuch as equal justice cannot be realized. Mallard encapsulated that
dilemma. Imagaining myself a member of the Court, I would have
empathized with the minority but voted with the majority.
The case arose out of the refusal of AttorneyJohn E. Mallard of the
Iowa bar to accept appointment by a United State Magistrate to rep-
resent inmates of a state prison in their civil suit against prison offi-
cials seeking redress for brutalities and other wrongs. The inmates
had filed the suit informapauperis. The Magistrate evidently thought
the allegations were not frivolous. A meritorious claim of brutality
perpetrated on incarcerated people surely qualifies for publicly-
provided assistance of counsel. Attorney Mallard, however, refused
the appointment. The Magistrate ordered him to comply. Mallard
still refused and appealed to the District Judge. The District Judge
ordered him to comply. Continuing his refusal, Mallard sought man-
damus from the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth
Circuit denied the application. Mallard's petition for certiorari was
granted by the Supreme Court, which then reversed.
Mallard's eligibility for appointment came from a list of attorneys
admitted to practice before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa. Becoming a member of a federal court bar
is a step beyond admission to practice in the state and nominally en-
tails special qualifications and special responsibilities. Mallard evi-
dently got admitted to the federal court because his areas of practice
included bankruptcy, which is within the exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion, and securities law, which is primarily within the federal do-
61d. at 1823.
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main. The question was whether admission entailed a legally
enforceable responsibility to represent indigents.
The court's appointment system involved an organization called
the Volunteer Lawyers Project. This organization was jointly spon-
sored by the Legal Services Corporation of Iowa, a federally funded
legal assistance organization, and the Iowa State Bar Association.
The Volunteer Lawyers Project, as the name implies, evidently be-
gan as a group of lawyers volunteering to accept indigent appoint-
ments. However, the system had become mandatory. Every lawyer
on the federal court rolls was subject to a call to serve, which worked
out to one appointment about every three years.
The system was conceived as giving effect to professional virtue, a
lawyer's obligation to represent the poor. Such an obligation is a
classic canon of the legal profession. The canon contemplates practi'-
tioners ready to provide services to whomever may be in need of legal
assistance. The clients pay if they are able, but will be served none-
theless if they cannot. This vision accordingly contemplates practi-
tioners competent to handle practically whatever matter may come
through the door, whether it be a will, a deed, the replevin of a cow,
or a criminal charge such as horse stealing.
The classic canon also assumes a limited number of practitioners,
not simply "the bar" but the bar. Members of such a bar constitute an
oligopoly. This economic position provides its members an income
that is steady and large enough to permit them to maintain respec-
tability and to afford professional beneficence. Also contemplated is
a fellowship of the bar-a common identity, reciprocal obligations to
each other, and a shared sense of duty to others. Every lawyer is sup-
posed to share the burden of representing the poor and anyone who
shirks is subject to tacit but forceful peer disapproval. This tradi-
tional vision is, of course, romantic. The bar of the past to which it
relates had features that constrained practice of its ideals. These fea-
tures include the following.
Members of the bar were always concerned primarily, if not ex-
clusively, with matters involving fees, the more lucrative the better.
Most lawyers had been strivers who had endured a long and pre-
carious apprenticeship that could drain charitable instincts. Success-
ful lawyers usually had differentiated themselves into specialties
such as mortgage finance, wills and estates, business law, and main-
taining relations with the county commissioners and the state legisla-
ture. Whatever technique in advocacy they once possessed had
HeinOnline -- 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 215 1989
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atrophied, many of them had not been in a courthouse for years, and
some had never actually tried a case.
The social structure of the bar was another impediment to free
legal services. Lawyers recognized that their status in practice was
largely a function of the status of their clientele, and generally wanted
no truck with impecunious felons. Relationships among members of
the bar were shaped by professional status. The trial bar had some-
thing of a fellowship, bound together in chronic apprehension over
unpredictability of juries and idiosyncrasy of judges, these being the
primary subjects of their professional conversation. The mortgage,
probate, and corporation lawyers found their way into sub-circles
identified by where they took luncheon and played golf. Within each
group there were great individual differences in competence, effi-
ciency, sense of responsibility, and disposition toward public service.
However, most were known to be very conserving of their time and
advice, which after all, as Lincoln said, was their stock in trade.
The bar not only was divided along practice lines but also was
riven by social division and personal animosities. Where entrance to
the bar had been achieved by ethnic and religious minorities, for ex-
ample Irish Catholics and Jews, there were additional divisions along
such lines. The bar was a human institution embedded in local so-
ciety. This meant that notions of professional virtue, though firmly
proclaimed, were only tenuously shared. All these considerations
militated against providing legal services to people lacking means
to pay.
The community and the bar nevertheless held together more or
less. Social peace is a blessing in itself and a necessary predicate for
pursuit of property and happiness. Most people realize this truth,
not least the lawyers. Their calling involves canalization of conflict
into peaceful and stable resolutions. That task includes seeing to it
that cries of injustice not go unheeded, at least sharp cries about man-
ifest specific injustice. Ignoring such cries embarrasses the legal sys-
tem's pretension to just ordering of relations within the community,
and that in turn threatens the community's very fabric. A commu-
nity whose fabric is torn apart offers no vocation for lawyers. There
is thus an element of long term professional self-interest in the obli-
gation to serve indigents who are accused of crime or in other kinds of
legal trouble.
Persons in positions of authority in the traditional community gen-
erally acted in a sensible way. Otherwise, they did not remain in such
positions. This was true in particular of authorities in the administra-
[1989
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tion of justice. Accordingly, in criminal cases by and large the pros-
ecutor did not bring charges except on good ground. Good ground
required that the accused be either provably guilty or probably
guilty and socially marginal. Whether a defense would be interposed
was up to the accused. An affluent accused, for example, a bank of-
ficer charged with defalcation, could retain counsel as he would have
in a will contest or litigation over an easement. While there was a
right to retain counsel, however, there was no right to have counsel.
Appointing counsel for an indigent accused criminal was therefore
not a necessary practice, except in unusual cases. From time to time a
judge would think the basis of a prosecution was doubtful, perhaps
because the prosecutor was on a tear or because the police seemed to
have bungled the investigation. Counsel then had to be appointed. In
a heavy case, the judge would ask an experienced member of the trial
bar to undertake the representation. In other cases one of the firms
was asked to send over one of the young fellows.
The appointments would be accepted. These occasional undertak-
ings were needed in order to maintain respect for the system of jus-
tice and to guard against injustice in the case of a defendant who was
actually innocent. The bar understood that such appointments had
to be made and that the judge would be sensible in distributing them.
The burden on a leading lawyer of being appointed in a capital case
or other heavy assignment was offset by the professional recognition
implied in the appointment. Tendering the service of juniors solid-
ified the leading law offices' commitment to professionalism. Ac-
cepting an appointment also banked good will with the judiciary.
An essentially similar system took care of civil legal assistance, but
appropriately at a lower level of regularity and intensity. In the first
place, injustice in civil matters generally was considered to have less
severe and obvious consequences than injustice in criminal matters.
In the second place, it was assumed that when poor people came to a
lawyer's office with a substantial meritorious legal problem, they
would get help. Legal assistance would be provided either directly
by the lawyer or by referral to a legal aid office, which would have
been established in larger communities. In this way the poor were
assisted in dealing with unjust evictions, repossessions, marital dis-
cord such as spousal assault, and juvenile court proceedings. Un-
meritorious cases were not given assistance. A competent lawyer
could tell an unmeritorious case when he saw one, especially if he
was free to decline it. Occa~ionally the poor were wrongly turned
away, or intimidated from seeking legal help in the first place.
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Sometimes an indigent would take a civil matter directly to court,
appearing inpropia persona. If the indigent was a defendant, the court
tried to assure itself that the claim was at least facially valid. Judicial
scrutiny was sometimes superficial and was difficult to give effect in
matters prosecuted by lawyers over whom the court had no effective
leverage, such as sleazy collection attorneys. Nevertheless, it pro-
vided a safeguard against serious abuse.
Pro per plaintiffs presented much greater difficulty for the court.
Mostproper claims had poor legal foundation, even if they might be
morally worthy. The judge would accurately conjecture that aproper
plaintiff had been turned down by lawyers on this very ground. Few
claimants understood court procedure or the limitations of the
judge's role and powers. However, now and then a case appeared that
had something to it. A substantial non-frivolous civil claim by a poor
person is entitled to the judicial system's attention on a par with
criminal cases. The system did not give an indigent civil claimant a
right to counsel for that would clog the courts with frivolous cases
and put the administration of justice in disrepute. It therefore re-
quired the judge to assess whether a case had such apparent merit
that a lawyer should be prevailed on.
Appointment of counsel in this classic situation rested on essen-
tially the same institutions as appointments in criminal cases. The
judge exercised prudent restraint in asking lawyers to serve and law-
yers exercised prudent alacrity in responding, both guided by a pro-
fessional narrative concerning law and justice. 7 Lawyers who were
unwilling or unfit to serve simply remained outside the system, un-
burdened by professional obligation but also unbenefited by judicial
and professional approbation. The system thus depended on re-
ciprocity, the medium of exchange being elemental political cur-
rency, which is to say standing and influence.
Circumstances gradually changed. The appellate courts came to
lay it down that counsel had to be provided in every significant crimi-
nal case. First, it was capital cases where the particular facts indi-
cated that an acquittal might well have resulted if the defendant had
had the assistance of counsel. Then cases involving serious pro-
cedural irregularity. Then felony prosecutions generally. Then all
cases where jail was a possibility. The state appellate courts in politi-
7See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv.
L. Rev. 4 (1983).
[1989
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cally liberal states pointed the way, but the weight of authority was
provided in Supreme Court decisions making appointment of coun-
sel a matter of due process. 8
Congress ratified the requirement that counsel be appointed in
criminal cases in federal court. The states that had public defender
systems, many since the early part of the century, enlarged those sys-
tems. States that previously depended on the appointment system
created defender systems for the cities and larger towns. Other states
continued to rely on the appointment system but required that ap-
pointed counsel be compensated.
Requiring that a criminal defendant have legal representation
made hostage of the public's concern that criminals be put in jail.
Criminals could not be put in jail except according to due process;
due process, so held the Supreme Court, now required that defense
lawyers be provided; since the public wanted criminals put in jail,
defense lawyers had to be provided. It was inconceivable that the Su-
preme Court would recede from Gideon in the foreseeable future. It
was also inconceivable that criminal prosecutions should abate for
want of defense lawyers. Conservatives and liberals would join in
voting appropriations. Public provision for criminal legal aid might
be grudging and insufficient but there was no getting around it.
Civil legal aid was something else. The notion that due process
meant lawyer-assisted process never took hold in civil matters. For
one thing, there was a long tradition, exemplified in workman's com-
pensation proceedings, juvenile court, and small claims, that legal
dispute resolution could be more just, more expeditious and less ex-
pensive if lawyers were kept out. For another thing, in civil cases
there was no apparatus of legal assistance provided by the state to
assist one side, as was provided for the prosecution in criminal cases. 9
There was a more fundamental difficulty in fixing the provision of
civil legal aid. The measure of necessary legal aid in criminal cases
was the quantum provided the prosecution. There was no similar
measure for civil legal aid. To provide a lawyer to an indigent civil
grievant was in effect to confer a subsidy in the amount of nuisance
8The seminal case is of course Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
91n Gideon v. Wainwright, id. at 344, the Court observed: "Governments, both state and
federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants
accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential... That govern-
ment hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are
the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessi-
ties, not luxuries."
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settlement value to beneficiaries arbitrarily selected in terms of in-
come or wealth and self-selecting in terms of disposition to litigate.
Implicitly recognizing this, the courts were willing to say that due
process required legal aid only in narrowly limited civil categories. 10
In other civil matters provision of legal aid would have to remain de-
pendent on someone's exercise of discretion to calibrate demand with
a supply.
The old system rationed supply through waiting lines at lawyers'
chambers, courthouses, and legal-aid offices, and judicial discretion
in pro per cases. This arrangement constituted charity, which was
considered obnoxious by champions of the poor, and depended on
grace, which is always in short and erratic supply. But it did the job
of rationing justice. I The authority to allocate those means was
widely diffused and low in visibility and accountability. In terms of
the system as it existed, however, it was exercised by politically re-
sponsible authority.
In the late 1960s an attempt was made through the Great Society
program to make civil legal aid a matter of legal right or at least politi-
cal right. It was to be a matter not of the bar's professional responsi-
bility but of entitlement under public law. However, the scope of
potential entitlement was to be defined by budgetary constraints,
not in terms of legally specified categories. The causes for which le-
gal aid might be provided thus were limited only by fiscal resources
and legal imagination. In time, that imagination would embrace ra-
cial equality, gender equality, a pollution-free environment, a drug-
free America, the right to live for the unborn, the right to die for the
afflicted, the right of association, the right of privacy, the right to see,
the right not to see. In aggregate, civil legal aid was seen as a writ of
entry into the New Jerusalem. Skeptics thought these possibilities
could not be realized; conservatives feared that they might be.
The result has been continuous political struggle over legal aid. 12
Public funding of civil legal aid has been held nominally static for a
decade, and in real terms has been cut about in half through inflation.
Conflict over the scope and aims of legal aid can be found even in the
more confined domain of legal assistance in criminal cases. The pay-
I0 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Service, 452 U.S. 18(1981).
"See Hazard, RationingJustice, 8J. Law & Econ. 1(1965)
'
2See generally Cramton, Crisis in Legal Services for the Poor, 26 Villanova L. Rev. 521
(1981).
[1989
HeinOnline -- 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 220 1989
PROFESSIONAL VIRTUE 221
ment rates authorized by Congress for appointed counsel in the
federal criminal cases have rapidly eroded through inflation. The
payment rates authorized for appointed counsel in the state systems
have been generally worse than the federal allowances. Public de-
fender systems are kept spare in professional staff, sparer still in par-
alegal staff and wage scales. None of the systems adequately
provides for expenses such as necessary investigations. Those re-
sponsible for appropriations at the federal, state and local level gener-
ally begrudge the money, and understandably so. There are many
other poor and unfortunates-mothers with dependent children,
old people, homeless, bed-ridden, sick, abused, ill-housed, unedu-
cated, and just poor-who are just as badly off and much more de-
serving.
Among the signs of strain has been the attempt to make the ap-
pointed counsel system work notwithstanding the burdens imposed
on it, as in the Southern District of Iowa. A system of voluntary ser-
vice can work if the providers are few in number and have sustaining
relationships with each other. Everyone can scrutinize how burdens
are shared and can effectively inflict the sanction of disapproval on
the shirkers. When the system becomes large, informality is no
longer sustainable. Participants have to be identified by list, assign-
ments have to be made according to systematic selection, and those
who fail to comply have to be brought to book with formal legal sanc-
tions.
Although the service in the Southern District of Iowa was still
called the Lawyer's Volunteer Project, a compulsory procedure de-
termined the number and schedule of needed appointments, selected
the appointees, approved compensation in criminal cases, and im-
posed sanctions against the uncooperative. The bar provided spon-
sorship, but the local profession had long ceased to be a fellowship of
similarly accomplished practitioners of a commonly understood
craft. The transformation of the profession in the Southern District
of Iowa was starkly illustrated in Attorney Mallard's plea of avoid-
ance from service.13
In his motion to withdraw from the appointment petitioner's
stated that he had no familiarity with the legal issues presented in
the case, that he lacked experience in deposing and cross-
examining witnesses, and that he would willing volunteer his ser-
13109 S.Ct. at 1817.
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vices in an area in which he possessed some expertise, such as
bankruptcy and securities law.
It is difficult to dispute that Attorney Mallard had a strong point.
It is perhaps more difficult to deal with the implications of the point.
Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue concludes with the thought that:
"In a society where there is no longer a shared conception of the com-
munity's good ... the alternatives become those of defining justice
in terms of some sort of equality ... or in terms of legal entitle-
ment."14
Mallard memorializes our situation after professional virtue has
ceased to be a plausible foundation for legal assistance to the poor.
But where is the shared conception of the community's good that
would enable us to formulate coherent terms of entitlement to such
assistance?
14Maclntyre, After Virtue 217-18 (1981).
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